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THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
PAULETTE BROWN

 
INTRODUCTION 
In early 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. led what would become 
known as the “Birmingham Campaign” with the Southern Leadership 
Conference in which confrontations between protestors and police were 
widely publicized.
1 
Protesters included elementary school students who 
would be seen worldwide on television being hosed with high-pressure 
water hoses and attacked by police dogs.
2
 1963 and 1964 saw sit-ins at 
lunch counters such as the Woolworth’s and wade-ins at pools in places 
like St Augustine, Florida. These confrontations were televised and 
brought the Civil Rights movement into the American home. 
In June 1963, Medgar Evers, the civil rights leader, was shot in the 
back while entering his home. In September 1963, four little girls died in 
the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama. 
President John F. Kennedy, who had long struggled with the moral issue 
of civil rights, addressed the nation about the topic of civil rights on June 
11, 1963, declaring that “[t]hose who do nothing are inviting shame as 
well as violence [and t]hose who act boldly are recognizing right as well 
as reality.”3 From this era of protest and violence was born the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (the “Act”).4 Now fifty years later we reflect on the 
Act’s promise, whether the promise of the Act has been fulfilled and for 
whom, and consider the future of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
On June 19, 1963, President Kennedy sent a Civil Rights Act to 
Congress.
5
 The bill sent by President Kennedy sought to address 
discrimination in public places but refrained from addressing 
discrimination in employment.
6
 Also, President Kennedy’s bill did not 
 
 
  President elect, American Bar Association; Partner, Locke Lord Edwards LLP. J.D., Seton 
Hall University School of Law; B.A., Howard University. 
 1. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The 1964 Civil Rights Act: The Crucial Role of Social Movements in 
the Enactment and Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Law, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J 1147, 1150 
(2004). 
 2. Id. 
 3. President John F. Kennedy, Report to the American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1964) 
(transcript available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/LH8F_0Mzv0e6Ro1yEm74Ng.aspx). 
 4. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241(1964). 
 5. H.R. Res. 7152, 88th Cong. (1963). 
 6. Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 434 
(1966). 
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contemplate gender equality. Title VII as originally introduced in the 
House of Representatives merely authorized a Commission on Equal 
Employment Opportunity, which would have the powers “to prevent 
discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion or national origin in 
Government employment.”7 
Title VII of the equal employment provision of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 took shape over a long amendment and debate process. Gender 
equality was added only two hours before a vote on the Act, and was only 
included as means of derailing it.
8
 This last minute addition has 
significantly shaped the application of the Act over the course of the past 
50 years. 
Fifty years after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, some 
parallels can be drawn between the debates and amendments that shaped 
the Act and the controversy surrounding the Supreme Court’s decision in 
2013, in which it significantly reshaped provisions for voting equality hard 
fought for in the debates of 1964 and 1965 and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965—the progeny to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
Periodically, we pause to reflect on great moments in history such as 
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In 2014, fifty years after the 
enactment of the Act, which sought to end segregation in public places and 
ban employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex 
and national origin, we must reflect and ask—has the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 lived up to its promise? 
In many ways the promise of the Act has been realized in areas likely 
not visualized by its framers. For example, it has provided the legal basis 
for advancement with respect to sexual orientation discrimination and 
disability discrimination. The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has 
received and investigated nearly a million charges of employment 
discrimination in the last decade.
9
 At the same time, efforts to bring about 
racial equality through such means as affirmative action have been 
curtailed, and in many ways the reach of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has 
been slow with respect to its original promise of racial equality. We need 
not go further than our own profession of law, which has experienced 
painfully slow and at times nonexistent increases in diversity and 
inclusion. The American Lawyer has discussed the “Diversity Crisis” in 
 
 
 7. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 8. Id. at 441–42. 
 9. Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/ 
enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Dec. 6, 2014). 
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big law firms across the nation.
10
 “More than a quarter century after the 
first national efforts to boost the presence of black lawyers at large firms, 
African-American partners” remain rare at most firms, notwithstanding the 
fact that large firms have “more than doubled in size in the past two 
decades.”11 
It is in this light that this Article examines the path that led to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, particularly legislation on civil rights and the 
inclusion of antidiscrimination in employment provisions; looks to the 
promise of the Act and its expansion; and finally asks whether the promise 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been realized in the area it most clearly 
targeted—racial discrimination. Part I of this Article discusses federal 
legislation on civil rights leading up to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
specifically, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1957. Part II focuses on the 
Act, discussing the atmosphere in which the Act was proposed by 
President Kennedy and ushered through Congress by President Lyndon 
Johnson. Part II also includes a synopsis legislative history of Title VII 
focusing on the unintended manner in which “sex” was added to the Act. 
Part III discusses the expansion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into areas 
not forecasted in President Kennedy’s vision, and how these populations 
have benefitted from the Act. Part III also looks at the Act’s effect on 
racial discrimination through the lens of diversity and inclusion in the 
legal profession and discusses ways in which the promise of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 has not been realized with respect to racial equality in 
employment. Part IV concludes by looking prospectively to the next fifty 
years and proposing steps that can be taken to better fulfill the promise of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
I. FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON CIVIL RIGHTS LEADING TO THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
A. Civil Rights Act of 1866 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, “An Act to protect all Persons in the 
United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their 
Vindication,” marked the first time Congress legislated on the issue of 
 
 
10. Juliet Triedman, The Diversity Crisis: Big Firms’ Continuing Failure, THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER (May 29, 2014), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202656372552/The-Diversity-Crisis% 
3A-Big-Firms’-Continuing-Failure. 
 11. Id. 
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civil rights.
12
 It was enacted on the heels of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
which abolished slavery, and in response to the “Black Codes”—state 
legislation, which placed restrictions on the activities and movement of 
freed slaves. “Black Codes” essentially circumvented the Thirteenth 
Amendment
13
 to the extent that the “freedom” granted to slaves under the 
amendment was meaningless. It is in this light that the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 was enacted. The debate in the Senate and House centered on the 
statute’s broad language. Interestingly, this emphasis on broad language 
and application was also prominent in the congressional debate preceding 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 did several important things which were 
impactful to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 
overturned the Supreme Court’s 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,14 
by declaring that all persons born in the United States, with the exception 
of non-tax paying Native Americans, were citizens of the United States. 
The Dred Scott Court had held that only Congress could confer citizenship 
and that Article II of the Constitution did not confer such citizenship to 
slaves.
15
 Through the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress finally conferred 
the citizenship the Dred Scott Court had discussed. 
Civil rights cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 have been 
prosecuted well past the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in areas 
such as housing discrimination,
16
 racially discriminatory policies in 
schools
17
 and employment, specifically, with respect to racial 
harassment.
18
  
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provides in relevant part 
that: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal 
 
 
 12. 14 Stat. 27-30 (1866). 
 13. The Thirteenth Amendment states: 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
U.S. Const. amend. XIII. 
 14. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 15. Id. at 405. 
 16. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 17. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 18. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1988). 
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benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every 
kind, and to no other. 
Runyon v. McCrary held that the prohibition on racial discrimination 
extended to private schools, noting that it has been long held that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 “prohibits racial discrimination in the making and 
enforcement of private contracts.”19 The Supreme Court in Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union held “that racial harassment relating to the 
conditions of employment is not actionable under § 1981 because that 
provision does not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation of a 
contract and which does not interfere with the right to enforce established 
contract obligations.”20 As such, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 has been 
interpreted to apply only in the formation of a contract and not prevent 
discrimination after such formation. 
B. Civil Rights Act of 1957 
Proposed in 1957 by President Eisenhower, the Civil Rights Act of 
1957 was the first civil rights legislation since Reconstruction and came on 
the heels of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education.
21
 Brown declared “separate but equal” institutions 
unconstitutional.
22
 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, the 
Justice Department began work on drafting civil rights legislation and 
establishing strategies to overcome the anticipated filibuster in Congress.
23
 
Although the final Act after amendment was a shell of what it was at its 
inception, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 accomplished two vitally important 
missions. First, it established the Civil Rights Section of the Justice 
Department. Second, it established the Civil Rights Commission.
24
 “Both 
of these agencies have been powerful forces in promoting civil rights over 
the years.”25 
Interestingly, Lyndon B. Johnson, who would later push to get the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 passed, similarly pushed through the Civil Rights Act 
 
 
19. Id. at 168 (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975); 
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 439–40 (1973)). 
 20. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171. 
 21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 22. Id. at 493. 
 23. Herbert Brownell, Essay, Civil Rights in the 1950s, 69 TUL. L. REV. 781, 791 (1995). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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of 1957. However, it was the compromises that Lyndon Johnson had to 
make to get this Act passed that eviscerated much of the power from the 
bill as originally proposed. 
II. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
A. The Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
In President Kennedy’s televised national address on civil rights and 
race relations, on June 11, 1963, he promised to enforce the civil rights of 
every American.
26
 Sometimes referred to as the moment that defined 
President Kennedy’s legacy,27 this address was intended to confront the 
crisis at the University of Alabama, where the Alabama National Guard 
confronted Alabama Governor George Wallace and desegregated the 
University of Alabama on orders from the President.  
In his inaugural speech, Governor Wallace had proclaimed 
“Segregation now! Segregation tomorrow! Segregation forever!” and on 
June 11, 1963, surrounded by state troopers, Governor Wallace blocked 
the entrance to registration at the University of two Black students, Vivian 
Malone Jones and James Hood.
28
 President Kennedy issued Proclamation 
3542, “Unlawful Obstructions of Justice and Combinations in the State of 
Alabama.”29 Governor Wallace stepped aside only after the Deputy 
Attorney General of the State of Alabama returned with Proclamation 
3542 and the federally deputized Alabama National Guard. It was the 
intent of President Kennedy to address the nation if the crisis continued so 
it was assumed that the President would no longer address the Nation 
when Governor Wallace stepped aside. However, President Kennedy 
asked that a speech be drafted and continued with his plan for a televised 
national address. 
 
 
 26. Kennedy, supra note 3. 
 27. Peniel E. Joseph, Kennedy’s Finest Moment N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/opinion/kennedys-civil-rights-triumph.html. 
 28. See Civil Rights Movement, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Civil-Rights-Movement.aspx?p=2 (last visited Dec. 6, 
2014).  
 29. Proclamation No. 3542, 3 C.F.R. 292 (1959–63). Proclamation 3542 concluded:  
Now, Therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, under and by 
virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, 
including Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the United States Code, particularly sections 332, 333 and 
334 thereof, do command the Governor of the State of Alabama and all other persons engaged 
or who may engage in unlawful obstructions of justice, assemblies, combinations, 
conspiracies or domestic violence in that State to cease and desist therefrom.  
Id. 
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President Kennedy began his address by giving an account of what had 
occurred at the University of Alabama.
30
 The President then reminded the 
nation that when it had called on individuals to go to war in Germany and 
Vietnam that the nation had not only asked whites to go to war, but had 
been indiscriminate in its recruitment and drafting of all Americans.
31
 
Therefore, the President stated that as Blacks had been asked to go to war, 
“[i]t ought to be possible . . . for American students of any color to attend 
any public institution they select without having to be backed up by 
troops.”32 President Kennedy then laid out the promise of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, in what he referred to as the promise of America as a 
Nation—that all “American consumers of any color [would] receive equal 
service in places of public accommodation, such as hotels and restaurants 
and theaters and retail stores, without being forced to resort to 
demonstrations in the street”; that all “American citizens of any color [be 
allowed] to register and to vote in a free election, without interference or 
fear of reprisal”; that “every American . . . enjoy the privileges of being 
American, without regard to his race or his color”; and that “[i]n short, 
every American . . . have the right to be treated as he would wish to be 
treated.”33 
Importantly, President Kennedy confronted the issue of civil rights as a 
“moral issue” and a “moral crisis” not regional or unique to any particular 
part of the country and not merely a political issue. He stated that 
legislation “cannot solve this problem alone. It must be solved in the 
homes of every American in every community across our country.”34 
On November 22, 1963, about five months after President Kennedy set 
forth the promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he was assassinated in 
Dallas, Texas. Much has been written about President Lyndon B. Johnson 
with respect to his personal beliefs and support of civil rights; however, 
irrespective of motivation or personal feelings on the issue of race 
equality, it is not disputed that Lyndon B. Johnson used his reputed 
influence in the Congress to push through the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
35
 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s push of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 began with his 
address to a joint session of the Congress on November 27, 1963. 
President Johnson proclaimed that “no memorial oration or eulogy could 
 
 
 30. Kennedy, supra note 3  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Brownell, supra note 23, at 791. 
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more eloquently honor President Kennedy’s memory than the earliest 
possible passage of the civil rights bill for which he fought so long.”36 In 
addressing the long history of civil rights, President Johnson stated that the 
nation had “talked for one hundred years or more” about equal rights and 
that it was time “to write the next chapter, and to write it in the books of 
law.”37 In his address, President Johnson reiterated the promise of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964—”a civil rights law” that would “eliminate from 
this Nation every trace of discrimination and oppression that is based upon 
race or color.”38 
B. Overview of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted 
[t]o enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction 
upon the district courts of the United States to provide injunctive 
relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize 
the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights 
in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission 
on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted 
programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment 
Opportunity, and for other purposes.
39
 
This part of the Article explores the various ways in which the Act 
attempted to fulfill this purpose.  
1. Voting Rights 
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 barred unequal application of 
voter registration requirements. However, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
allowed for the use of literacy tests as a qualification, so long as the test 
was administered to every individual and conducted in writing, although a 
rebuttable presumption was written in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that if 
the person had not been adjudged incompetent and had at least a sixth 
grade level education, they could vote.
 40
 
 
 
 36. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Speech Before a Joint Session of Congress (Nov. 27, 1963) 
(transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/kennedy/Joint%20Congress%20Speech/ 
speech.htm). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352. 
 40. Id. § 101.  
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2. Injunctive Relief Against Discrimination in Places of Public 
Accommodation 
Title II barred discrimination in lodging establishments, including 
hotels and motels; eating establishments, like restaurants and lunch 
counters where sit-ins had occurred; places of entertainment, such as 
theaters, retail establishments; and all other public accommodations where 
“operations of the establishment affect commerce,” as defined in the 
statute. However, private clubs, though not defined, were exempted from 
Title II. Under Title II, the Attorney General was authorized to bring 
action against any person or group of persons engaging in discrimination 
barred under this title.
41
 
3. Desegregation of Public Facilities 
Title III authorized the Attorney General, upon receiving a written 
complaint of discrimination with respect to a public facility, to bring an 
action, as long as the Attorney General believed the complaint to be 
meritorious, and the person submitting the complaint did not have the 
ability to initiate and maintain legal proceedings independently.
42
 
4. Desegregation of Public Education 
Title IV encouraged the desegregation of public schools by 
commissioning surveys and reports discussing the lack of equal 
educational opportunities; rendering technical assistance to school 
districts; providing training institutes to school teachers and personnel to 
deal with problems resulting from desegregation; providing grants to 
school boards; and finally, authorizing the Attorney General to bring suit 
on receipt of a complaint and determination that the individual or 
individuals subject to violations of Title IV were unable to bring and 
maintain a legal proceeding. It also allowed the Attorney General to bring 
suit to force desegregation.
43
  
 
 
 41. Id. §§ 201–207. 
 42. Id. §§ 301–304. 
 43. Id. §§ 401–410. 
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5. Commission on Civil Rights 
As discussed herein, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 authorized the 
establishment of a Commission on Civil Rights; however, under the Title 
V of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, procedures of the Commission were 
more clearly laid out or established and the duties of the Commission were 
expanded. The Act authorized the Commission through January 1968.
44
 
The Commission has been consistently reauthorized since, most recently 
with the Civil Rights Commission Amendments Act of 1994.
45
 
6. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs 
Title VI authorized the withdrawal of federal funds from programs 
which practiced discrimination. All such withdrawals of federal funds 
under Title VI would be subject to judicial review.
46
 
7. Equal Employment Opportunity 
As further detailed below, Title VII barred discrimination in 
employment in any business employing more than twenty-five people. 
Further, Title VII created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
to review and investigate complaints.
47
 
8. Registration and Voting Statistics 
Title VIII directed the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a survey to 
collect registration and voting statistics based on race, color, and national 
origin, but provided that individuals could not be compelled to disclose 
such information.
48
 
9. Intervention and Procedure After Removal in Civil Rights Cases  
Though an order to remand a case to the state court from which it was 
removed is not typically reviewable by a federal appellate court, Title IX 
provided that civil rights cases remanded to state court could be subject to 
review by a federal appeals court. In addition, Title IX allowed the 
 
 
 44. Id. §§ 501–507. 
 45. Pub. L. No. 103-419.  
 46. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 601–605. 
 47. Id. §§ 701–716. 
 48. Id. § 801. 
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Attorney General to intervene on behalf of the United States where the 
case was deemed to be of “general public importance.”49  
10. Establishment of Community Relations Service 
Title X was established, initially as a part of the Department of 
Commerce, a Community Relations Service (“CRS”), which was later 
moved to the Department of Justice. The CRS was created to provide 
assistance to communities in resolving disputes relating to discriminatory 
practices, where they might affect commerce.
50
 
Title XI
51
 contained a number of miscellaneous provisions. 
C. Legislative History: The Addition of “Sex” into Title VII 
President Kennedy’s civil rights bill proposed to address discrimination 
in employment. The issue, however, was not new to Congress. In fact, 
several civil rights bills proposing to address discrimination in both public 
and private employment had been proposed in 1963.
52
 At the very 
beginning of the congressional session H.R. 405, titled “A Bill to Prohibit 
Discrimination in Employment in Certain Cases Because of Race, 
Religion, Color, National Origin, Ancestry or Age,” was proposed.53 After 
President Kennedy’s second address on civil rights, Representative 
Emanuel Celler of New York introduced H.R. 7152 in the House.
54
 H.R. 
7152 provided for the expansion of the powers of the Commission on 
Civil Rights, authorized under the Civil Rights Act of 1957 to advise and 
counsel in matters involving employment discrimination in both the 
private and public sectors.
55
 In addition, H.R. 7152 proposed to authorize 
the establishment of a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity,
56
 
which was established pursuant to Executive Order No. 10925. President 
Kennedy, through H.R. 7152, sought to give the Commission a statutory 
basis, and thereby solidify its existence and work.
57
 However, the 
Commission was not authorized to address discrimination in the private 
sector, but instead, only employment discrimination in government 
 
 
 49. Id. §§ 901–902. 
 50. Id. §§ 1001–1004. 
 51. Id. §§ 1101–1106. 
 52. See Vaas, supra note 6, at 433.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 434. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
538 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:527 
 
 
 
 
contracts and subcontracts, and in any federally financed or assisted 
programs.
58
 
During subcommittee hearings, H.R. 405, which had been introduced 
by Representative James Roosevelt earlier in the year, was incorporated 
into H.R. 7152 initially, as Title VIII of the latter resolution.
59
 The 
Judiciary Committee struck all but the enacting clause of H.R. 7152 and 
amended the bill so that the new Title VII now contained the fair 
employment provisions.
60
 However, the powers of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Board envisioned in H.R. 405 had been greatly reduced in the 
Title VII of H.R. 7152.
61
 The Judiciary Committee was concerned that as 
envisioned in H.R. 405, the Equal Employment Opportunity Board would 
have powers that extended into areas within the purview of the judiciary.
62
 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Board under the Judiciary Committee amendments retained the authority 
to investigate complaints “concerning the existence of discrimination in 
business establishments, labor unions and employment agencies.”63 
Notably, the Committee stressed that it was not its job to promote equity 
to a mathematical certainty, but rather to correct abuses, and that the 
Committee could not force racial balance in employment.
64
 
The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary was filed on 
November 20, 1963, only two days before President Kennedy was 
assassinated. H.R. 7152 was referred to the Committee on Rules five days 
after President Kennedy’s death. However, this speedy progress would not 
continue, and debate on the bill by the entire House did not begin until 
January 31, 1964.
65
 
After debate in the House, each amendment was read and voted on. 
With respect to Title VII, forty amendments were proposed; sixteen were 
accepted.
66
 Representative Celler proposed many of the accepted 
amendments. After amendment, the House bill ensured that where national 
origin was a factor in employment, it was a qualification of employment; 
that “sex” was an area where Title VII would protect from discrimination 
 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 435. 
 60. Id. at 435–36. 
 61. Id. at 435. 
 62. Id. at 436. 
 63. H.R. Rep. No. 88-914 (1963). 
 64. Id. 
 65. 110 Cong. Rec. 1511 (1964). 
 66. Vaas, supra note 6, at 438. 
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in employment; and that religious organizations and their affiliates could 
specify religion as an aspect of employment.
67
  
In Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
68
 the Supreme Court discussed 
the manner in which “sex” was added to the Civil Right Act of 1964, 
noting that 
The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to 
Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of 
Representatives. The principal argument in opposition to the 
amendment was that “sex discrimination” was sufficiently different 
from other types of discrimination that it ought to receive separate 
legislative treatment. This argument was defeated, the bill quickly 
passed as amended, and we are left with little legislative history to 
guide us in interpreting the Act’s prohibition against discrimination 
based on “sex.”69 
Important to later court interpretations of the term “sex,” Representative 
Howard W. Smith from the State of Virginia, when offering this 
amendment, read from a letter he purported to have received from a 
female constituent. This letter requested that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
also balance the inequalities between male and females.
70
 However, the 
letter, as read, weighed equality in quantitative terms, rather than 
qualitative disparities in areas such as employment or education.
71
  
Ultimately only two proposed amendments from the House were 
rejected in the Senate.
72
 At the conclusion of debate, amendment, vote and 
 
 
 67. Id. at 438–40. 
 68. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 69. Id. at 63–64 (citations omitted).  
 70. Vaas, supra note 6, at 441. 
 71. The letter read in part: 
I suggest that you might also favor an amendment or a bill to correct the present “imbalance” 
which exists between males and females in the United States. . . . The census of 1960 shows 
that we had 88,331,000 males living in this country, and 90,992,000 females, which leaves 
the country with an “imbalance” of 2,661,000 females. . . . 
 Just why the Creator would set up such an imbalance of spinsters, shutting off the “right” 
of every female to have a husband of her own, is, of course, known only to nature. But I am 
sure you will agree that this is a grave injustice to womankind and something the congress 
and president Johnson should take immediate steps to correct, especially in this election year. 
. . . Would you have any suggestions as to what course our Government might pursue to 
protect our spinster friends in their “right” to a nice husband and family? 
Quoted in Scott Highhouse, The History Corner: Was the Addition of Sex to Title VII a Joke? Two 
Viewpoints, SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, http://www.siop.org/tip/ 
jan11/12highhouse.aspx. 
 72. Vaas, supra note 6, at 441. 
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enactment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 stated in pertinent 
part: 
 (a) Employer practices 
 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
 (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or 
 (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
 (b) Employment agency practices 
 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment 
agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to 
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for 
employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.
73
  
III. FULFILLING A PROMISE: THE PAST 50 YEARS 
A. Affirmative Action—Once an Effective Tool 
Soon after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, President 
Johnson moved to take specific steps to “open the gates of opportunity” 
for African Americans. He did so by requiring that certain amounts of 
federal contract funding be reserved for “minority” businesses. 
On June 4, 1965, President Johnson gave the commencement address at 
Howard University.
74
 Acknowledging Howard University as an 
“outstanding center for the education of Negro Americans[,]” President 
 
 
 73. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 703 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2 (2012)).  
 74. Commencement Address at Howard University: “To Fulfill These Rights,” 2 PUB. PAPERS 
635 (June 4, 1965). 
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Johnson discussed the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1964 as the 
beginning of freedom for blacks in America
75
 President Johnson argued, 
however, that the freedoms granted by these acts were not enough, and 
that one cannot “wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: Now you are 
free to go where you want, and do as you desire, and choose the leaders 
you please.”76 President Johnson provided statistical evidence of the 
continued racial inequalities and thus, of “American failure.”77 President 
Johnson introduced what he saw as the next step in the civil rights 
movement: 
 You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by 
chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race 
and then say, “you are free to compete with all the others,” and still 
justly believe that you have been completely fair. 
 Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All 
our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates. 
 This is the next and the more profound stage of the battle for 
civil rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not 
just legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right and a 
theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result.
78
 
President Johnson’s commencement speech forecasted steps he would 
take to implement affirmative action as a means of creating opportunity 
and factual equity that would be evinced by results. Following his 
commencement address, on September 24, 1965, President Johnson took 
further steps to end racial discrimination among federal government 
contractors and contractors working on federally assisted projects.
79
 
Through Executive Order 11,246, President Johnson required “that 
contractors make good faith efforts to achieve certain ‘goals’ of minority 
employment.”80 President Johnson sought to accomplish these goals 
through the implementation of the “Philadelphia Plan,” issued on June 27, 
1969, to all federal agencies.
81
 Under the Philadelphia Plan, coordinators 
from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (“OFCC”) worked to 
 
 
 75. Id. at 635–36. 
 76. Id. at 636. 
 77. Id. at 637. 
 78. Id. at 636. 
 79. Robert P. Schuwerk, Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of 
Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 723–24 (1972). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 723 & n.5. 
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develop, in certain markets, compliance programs applied in the 
construction industry.
82
 For example, in Philadelphia, the low bidder on a 
federally assisted program, before the contract could be awarded to the 
bidder, was required to submit a plan indicating how the contractor would 
employ affirmative action to employ minority workers.
83
 If the plan was 
unacceptable, the OFCC would work with the contractor to reach a 
negotiated acceptable affirmative action plan.
84
 This controversial plan 
was revised under President Nixon to “require[] that construction bid 
invitations include target ranges, rather than quotas.”85 Though 
controversial, under the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the executive order 
and the affirmative action plan it required was approved by Congress.
86
 
At or about the same period that the Philadelphia Plan was being 
introduced by executive order and being implemented, the Medical School 
of the University of California was implementing an admissions process to 
change the profile of its 1968 class, which did not have a single ethnically 
diverse member.
87
 In its efforts to increase the number of minority 
students in the medical school, the University set aside 16 seats out of the 
100 open seats in the incoming class in 1971 for “disadvantaged” 
(essentially meaning minority) students.
88
  
Allan Bakke’s application for admission was denied in 1973 and 1974. 
Bakke sued the Medical School of the University of California at Davis, 
arguing that he was discriminated against due to his race.
89
 The United 
States Commission on Civil Rights (COCR) noted that in months leading 
to the Bakke decision, the case was compared to Brown v. Board of 
Education, in that the cases both sought “legal resolution to controversial 
issues on which there appeared to be no national consensus.”90 However, 
unlike Brown, the Court’s decision in Bakke brought very little clarity to 
the allowable use of affirmative action as a means to remedy the effects of 
racial discrimination.
91
 The Supreme Court ordered that Bakke be 
admitted, but also held that the State of California had “a substantial 
 
 
 82. Id. at 739. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 893, 
896. 
 86. Schuwerk, supra note 79, at 724–25. 
 87. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF BAKKE 1 (1979) 
[hereinafter “USCCR”]. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 90. USCCR, supra note 87, at 1. 
 91. Id. 
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interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions 
program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic 
origin.”92 The COCR expressed concerns about the uncertain application 
of the Bakke decision to affirmative action in settings other than higher 
education admissions.
93
  
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 
(Public Works Act) was challenged as unconstitutional.
94
 The Public 
Works Act conditioned the receipt of federal funding of state and local 
public works projects on the assurance that at least 10% of the value of the 
funding would be allotted to subcontract minority business enterprises 
(MBE). The Supreme Court first found that the Constitution, through the 
commerce clause, and Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce, 
enabled Congress to enact legislation that “control[led] discriminatory 
contract procurement practices.”95 Second, the Court found that Congress 
could enact legislation that used racial quotas and further require parties, 
even those not participating in the discrimination, to share the burden of 
righting the wrong of prior discrimination.
96
 However, Congress’ use of 
such quotas had to be narrowly tailored.
97
 
The Court would address this narrow tailoring in City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., which considered the use of racial quotas in the City of 
Richmond’s construction contract bidding process.98 For the first time, the 
Court applied the strict scrutiny standard as applied in equal protection 
analysis, stating that the standard would “assur[e] that the legislative body 
is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect 
tool.”99 Thus, after City of Richmond, affirmation action became a “highly 
suspect tool.” 
Twenty-five years after Bakke, the Supreme Court again addressed 
affirmation action in higher education. The Court reviewed the University 
of Michigan’s undergraduate100 and law school101 admissions processes, 
 
 
 92. Bakke, 483 U.S. at 320. 
 93. USCCR, supra note 87, at 3. 
 94. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
 95. Julia Grace Thigpen, Comment, Fullilove v. Klutznick: Do Affirmative Action Plans Require 
Congressional Authorization?, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1315, 1319 (1981). 
 96. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480; see also Thigpen, supra note 95, at 1321. 
 97. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480 (“We recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure 
that any congressional program that employs racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish the objective of 
remedying the present effects of past discrimination is narrowly tailored to the achievement of that 
goal.”). 
 98. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 99. Id. at 493. 
 100. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 101. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
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which employed different forms of racial quotas. The Court held that the 
University’s undergraduate program point system that awarded points to 
minorities did not hold up to strict scrutiny.
102
 On the other hand the law 
schools admissions process, which was a “highly individualized, holistic 
review of each applicant’s file,” stood up to strict scrutiny and was 
constitutional.
103
 Justice O’Connor famously concluded her decision by 
stating the expectation “that 25 years from now, the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved 
today.”104 
A little over a decade into Justice O’Connor twenty five-year limit on 
affirmative action, and almost fifty years after the enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether 
Michigan’s constitutional amendment banning affirmative action was 
constitutional.
105
 In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the 
justices disagreed as to whether the case was an affirmative action case, or 
as Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, argued, about “who may 
resolve [the debate about racial preferences]”.106 In a 6-2 decision, the 
Supreme Court held that Michigan’s constitutional amendment banning 
affirmative action was constitutional. However, it was Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg, that pointed to the history that 
affirmative action sought to put behind us, stating, “it is a history that still 
informs the society we live in, and so it is one we must address with 
candor.”107 Citing literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and post-Brown 
political restructuring, Justice Sotomayor argued that, under the 
“‘political-process doctrine,’” the majority disregarded stare decisis by 
upholding the political restructuring by Michigan’s amendment to ban 
affirmative action.
108
 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor noted that the 
admissions policies banned by Michigan’s constitutional amendment all 
met the strict scrutiny standard under Grutter “and thus already constituted 
the least restrictive ways to advance Michigan’s compelling interest in 
diversity in higher education.”109 
 
 
 102. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271–272. 
 103. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. 
 104. Id. at 343. 
 105. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014). 
 106. Id. at 1638. 
 107. Id. at 1654 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 108. Id. at 1653 (citing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969), Washington v. Seattle 
School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982)). The political-process doctrine states that “[w]hen the 
majority reconfigures the political process in a manner that burdens only a racial minority, that 
alteration triggers strict judicial scrutiny.” Id. 
 109. Id. at 1660. 
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Justice Sotomayor’s dissent noted that racial disparities are facts not 
only in our history, but are a part of our present society. She argued that 
we are choosing to ignore current racial disparities and warned against the 
evisceration of affirmative action, a necessary tool in fulfilling the promise 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
110
 Unfortunately, other tools that are 
necessary to fulfill that promise have also moved away from prioritizing 
the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to eliminating racial 
discrimination. 
B. The Changing Focus of the EEOC 
The EEOC has also been vital in the implementation of the Act’s 
promise. The scope of the EEOC’s authority was originally limited to 
receiving and investigating complaints, providing statistics, and 
researching discrimination in employment.
111
 Importantly, the EEOC did 
not begin with the authority to bring actions against employers. This 
important aspect of the EEOC’s work today came about in 1972, with the 
enactment of the Equal Employment Act.
112
 Until this time, the EEOC 
lacked the power to effectuate change. In addition, the EEOC suffered 
from significant organizational and administrative problems for the first 
seven years of its existence.
113
 These structural problems, including 
inadequate staffing, would persist and affect the EEOC’s ability to 
implement the promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Notwithstanding 
the difficulties in getting the EEOC on its feet, so to speak, the EEOC was 
able to force changes to the employment practices of several large national 
employers, including AT&T, General Electric, General Motors, Ford, and 
Sears.
114
  
Soon after the restructuring of the EEOC, President Carter shifted the 
enforcement of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and the Age Discrimination Act 
of 1967 from the Department of Labor to the EEOC.
115
 These additional 
enforcement responsibilities immediately impacted the number of charges 
it received. In 1978, the EEOC received further responsibilities when 
 
 
 110. Id. at 1683. 
 111. Anne Noel Occhialino and Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 671, 672–73 (2005). Why the EEOC (Still) Matters provides a complete overview of the 
EEOC from when it opened its doors through the 2000s, detailing its organizational changes as well as 
its changing responsibilities, and gives the number of matters handled from 1965 through about 2004.  
 112. Id. at 677. 
 113. Id. at 672–66. 
 114. Id. at 679–80. 
 115. Id. at 681–82. 
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Congress amended Title VII to encompass the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978.
116
 It was at this time that the Commission also began to see a 
shift in the types of charges it received and pursued. In the early 1980s, 
there was an increase in charges of age discrimination, and the EEOC also 
began to see an increase in the number of sexual discrimination charges.
117
 
The increase in sex discrimination charges is pertinent to the discussion 
herein of the challenges faced by the courts in interpreting the term “sex” 
and the expansion of Title VII to areas not anticipated when President 
Kennedy discussed the need for a comprehensive civil rights law.  
Although the EEOC would be plagued with understaffing and a lack of 
funds, in the 1990s, the its responsibilities in other areas increased again 
with the expansion of Title VII to disabled employees through the 
American with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act of 1990, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
118
 With these 
added responsibilities, the EEOC made significant strides in its charge and 
litigation process, including the implementation of alternative dispute 
resolution to be able to address its expanded responsibilities. The EEOC 
shifted focus. In 2009, President Obama signed the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act.
119
 In the years that have followed, the EEOC focused on hiring 
practices and equal pay. The Agency’s strategic enforcement plan for 
fiscal years 2013–2016 lists the following priorities: 
1. “Eliminating Barriers in Recruitment and Hiring. . . . 
2. Protecting Immigrant, Migrant and Vulnerable Workers. . . . 
3. Addressing Emerging and Developing Issues. . . . 
4. Enforcing Equal Pay Laws. . . . 
5. Preserving Access to the Legal System. . . . 
6. Preventing Harassment through Systematic Enforcement and 
Targeted Outreach.”120 
Very recently, EEOC stated that it had “an agency[-]wide focus on sex 
discrimination and equal pay issues for women.”121 This shift to focus on 
 
 
 116. Id. at 682. 
 117. Id. at 683. 
 118. Id. at 686. 
 119. Pub. L. No. 111-2 (2009). 
 120. Strategic Enforcement Plan FY 2013–2016, EEOC (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
eeoc/plan/sep.cfm. 
 121. Scott Flaherty, Equal Pay, Working Parents Top EEOC Priorities, Official Says, LAW360 
(June 5, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/545338/equal-pay-working-parents-top-eeoc-priorities 
-official-says. 
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sex discrimination began forty years ago with the advancement of the 
women’s movement and organizations such as the National Organization 
for Women (“NOW”), specifically established to promote Title VII with 
respect to women’s rights and to combat negative connotations of the 
women’s rights.122 Notably absent is a priority by the EEOC to bring 
claims based on race. 
C. Expansion of the Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The interpretation of the term “sex” in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
with little help from the limited legislative history, has been essentially 
defined by the courts. Interpreted initially to describe the male and female 
gender, notions of gender identity and gender stereotyping have come to 
shape the courts’ analysis of “sex” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. 
1. Interpretation of Title VII’s Prohibition Against Forms of Sex 
Discrimination  
Federal courts, noting the limited legislative history due to the speed 
and context with which “sex” was added to Title VII, initially held that the 
plain meaning of “sex” did not extend to transsexuals.123 These courts 
looked to the plain meaning of the term “sex” and defined “sex” under 
Title VII as being limited to the differences between men and women.
124
 
Particularly important to these courts was that later legislation did not 
change the language of Title VII to be more inclusive. Because of this, 
courts refused to extend the reach of Title VII where the legislature had 
chosen not to do so, given the opportunity. In Holloway v. Arthur 
Andersen & Co., the Ninth Circuit further noted that “[s]everal bills ha[d] 
been introduced to amend the Civil Rights Act to prohibit discrimination 
against ‘sexual preference’” and that “[n]one ha[d] been enacted into 
law.”125 Holloway was the first time an appellate court addressed 
transsexual discrimination. When Holloway was employed at Arthur 
Anderson, she appeared as a male but soon after being employed, began 
 
 
 122. See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 1152.  
 123. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget 
Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th 
Cir. 1977). 
 124. Brian P. McCarthy, Trans Employees and Personal Appearance Standards Under Title VII, 
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 945 (2008).  
 125. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 
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female hormone treatments. A few years later she informed her employer 
she would be undergoing surgery for anatomical change to female. In that 
same year, she requested that her human resource paperwork reflect her 
name as Ramona rather than Robert.
126
 Although the majority determined 
that this was a sexual preference case, and that Title VII did not protect 
against transgender discrimination, the dissent in the case viewed the issue 
differently. The dissent argued that the case was in fact a sexual 
discrimination case because Holloway had been terminated because she 
was a woman and the fact that she had not been born a woman was not 
relevant to the analysis under Title VII and that a different analysis should 
have occurred in the trial court and by the majority, and thus, the dismissal 
should be vacated and the case remanded.
127
 
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
128
 the Supreme Court introduced 
“sexual stereotyping” into the analysis of sexual discrimination under Title 
VII. Hopkins, in her candidacy for partnership at Price Waterhouse, was 
advised to be more feminine and specifically, to adjust not only how she 
walked, but also how she spoke, dressed, and wore her hair, makeup and 
jewelry.
129
 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins held that the Hopkins had been 
discriminated against because she was a woman and because the defendant 
had certain notions of how women should behave. The Court noted that 
although Hopkins was criticized for being aggressive, aggressiveness was 
in fact required for her job, and held that Hopkins’ gender, specifically 
gender stereotyping, played a motivating part in the decision to not make 
Hopkins a partner.
130
 
In the cases that followed Price Waterhouse, courts readily applied 
sexual stereotyping to cases in which traditional notions of gender, 
including appearance and behavior, were at issue. For example, in 
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., the Ninth Circuit found 
discrimination where a male employee did not appear to conform to 
traditional characteristic notions of his gender.
131
 However, some courts 
stopped at applying Price Waterhouse to cases brought under Title VII for 
transgender and transsexual discrimination,
132
 distinguishing Price 
 
 
 126. Id. at 661. 
 127. Id. at 664. 
 128. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 129. Id. at 235. 
 130. Id. at 244. 
 131. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 132. See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00–3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *6 (E.D. La. 
Sept. 16, 2002) (“This is not just a matter of an employee of one sex exhibiting characteristics 
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Waterhouse by “concluding that the decision by a transgender person to 
present as a different sex than his or her birth-assigned sex constitutes a 
wholly different form of gender nonconformity.”133 Emerging legal 
arguments in transgender discrimination have focused on the principle of 
sexual stereotyping laid out in Price Waterhouse, and have argued gender 
nonconformity is a basis of extending Title VII to transgender 
discrimination. The District Court for the District of Columbia is the only 
court to hold that Title VII applies per se to transgender discrimination.
134
 
Interestingly, the approach in Schroer v. Billington reflects the dissent in 
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., stating that the “Library’s refusal to 
hire Schroer after being advised that she planned to change her anatomical 
sex by undergoing sex reassignment surgery was literally discrimination 
‘because of . . . sex.’”135 
D. Unfulfilled Promises: Racial Discrimination in Employment 
Whereas the promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been extended 
to areas of sexual discrimination through application by the courts, and 
extended to disability discrimination by the legislature, the Act clearly 
always applied to racial discrimination.
136
 However, diversity in many 
sectors of employment remains low, indicating that there have been some 
limitations on the application of Title VII in certain professions. Notably, 
one of these professions is the legal profession. These limitations with 
respect to women attorneys and attorneys of color were highlighted by 
Professor Nancy Levit.
137
 Unfortunately, there has been no improvement 
with respect to diversity in the statistics discussed by Professor Levit. A
 
 
associated with the opposite sex. This is a matter of a person of one sex assuming the role of a person 
of the opposite sex.”). 
 133. Jason Lee, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender Employment 
Discrimination under Title VII, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 423, 435 (2012); see also Etsitty v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that Title VII only extended to 
transgender discrimination “if they are discriminated against because they are male or because they are 
female.”).  
 134. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 135. Id. at 308. 
 136. Kimberly A. Yuracko, The Antidiscrimination Paradox: Why Sex Before Race?, 6 
(Northwestern University School of Law, Working Paper No. 183, 2009), available at 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/183 (noting that “[a]lthough 
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on both race and sex, race was its primary 
target”); see also Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 1151. 
 137. Nancy Levit, Lawyers Suing Law Firms: The Limits on Attorney Employment Discrimination 
Claims and the Prospects for Creating Happy Lawyers, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 65, 70 (2011).  
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recent American Lawyer article summarized the current situation as 
follows: 
 In 2013, only 1.9 percent of partners—one in 54 at the 223 firms 
that submitted data for our Diversity Scorecard—were black, a 
percentage that hasn’t changed in five years. For black women 
partners, the numbers are even worse: They average just one in 
every 170 partners in our surveyed firms, half the number of black 
male partners, according to data collected by the National 
Association for Law Placement. 
 For black associates, the situation is not much better. The 
recession was a disaster for lawyers of all minorities at large firms; 
they were almost twice as likely to be laid off as their white peers. 
Between 2008 and 2009, the number of minority lawyers at the 
nation’s largest firms dropped by 9 percent, mostly associates. But 
while the numbers of Asian-American and Hispanic lawyers have 
since rebounded past prerecession levels, black lawyer head count 
has continued to slide. The percentage of black lawyers at the 
largest firms is now at a level not seen since 2000: 3 percent of all 
lawyers, down from 3.1 percent in 2012.
138
  
Although the American Lawyer focused its discussion on the diversity 
crisis at large firms, Professor Levit notes that 70% of lawyers work for 
firms which have fewer than fifteen employees.
139
 Title VII extends to 
businesses with twenty-five or more employees; however, the Equal 
Employment Act of 1972 extends Title VII to business having fifteen or 
more employees. Thus, as an initial matter, with respect to diversity and 
disparities in the legal profession, for 70% of lawyers, Title VII does not 
even apply. 
Moreover, the realities of the legal profession make employment 
discrimination actions difficult for lawyers generally. Most lawyers are 
subject to employment agreements requiring that such disputes be 
arbitrated.
140
 With respect to disparate treatment, litigations that have gone 
forward have been limited by the lack of required comparator evidence.
141
 
Litigants have been forced to rely on circumstantial evidence,
142
 and 
 
 
 138. Triedman, supra note 10. 
 139. Levit, supra note 137, at 70. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 72–74. 
 142. Id. at 74–75. 
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statistical comparisons of disparate impact and systemic disparate 
treatment do not provide needed case specific evidence.
143
  
“The numbers do not lie.”144 In the past fifty years, the promise of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been extended to a number of areas, 
particularly as it related to sex discrimination, through the application of 
Title VII in areas such as sexual orientation discrimination, gender identity 
discrimination, same-sex bias, and through the ADA, disability 
discrimination.
145
 As noted herein, equal pay and flexible work schedules, 
as they affect women in the workplace, is the current focus of the EEOC. 
However, the numbers with respect to racial disparities indicate that while 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 continues to be expanded to provide needed 
protection in areas other than race, the changed focus by the EEOC and 
eating away of affirmative action have been limiting. 
 As we embark on the next 50 years, what more can we do to continue 
to expand the reach of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 without adversely 
impacting its mission to address racial discrimination and the effect of past 
racial discrimination particularly in employment? 
IV. FULFILLING A PROMISE: THE NEXT 50 YEARS 
Race and color have historically been difficult issues to confront. There 
is no question that the three Civil Rights Acts were born of the pox of 
slavery. The expanding scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
changing focus and specific focus of the EEOC, and the whittling away at 
affirmative action has provided a means by which race can be avoided or 
at least be given a back seat. Considering the transition of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 over the past 50 years, one wonders whether the promise of 
race equality will ever be fully achieved.  
 
 
 143. Id. at 79–80. 
 144. Mellody Hobson, Color blind or color brave? (May 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.ted.com/talks/mellody_hobson_color_blind_or_color_brave/transcript). Hobson notes 
“significant, quantifiable racial disparities that cannot be ignored, in household wealth, household 
income, job opportunities, [and] healthcare.” Rejecting the notion of color blindness, similarly rejected 
by the Fullilove Court, as merely ignoring the problem, Hobson proposes that we move towards being 
a “color brave” society: 
So right now, what I’m asking you to do, I’m asking you to show courage. I’m asking you to 
be bold. As business leaders, I’m asking you not to leave anything on the table. As citizens, 
I’m asking you not to leave any child behind. I’m asking you not to be color blind, but to be 
color brave, so that every child knows that their future matters and their dreams are possible. 
Id. 
 145. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at (noting that “although the Act was designed to end 
discrimination against African-Americans, women have greatly benefited[,] largely because of the 
political mobilization of women that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s”). 
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 with respect to race, color, religion, sex 
or national origin is not an either-or proposition. The rights that others 
have been able to attain as a result of the Act should in no way be 
diminished. Over the course of the next 50 years, there has to be an 
additional focus on race. Going back to the words of President Johnson 
uttered at Howard University’s graduation on June 4, 1965, “the scars [of 
gone-by] centuries” continue to exist, but there are many tools available to 
take the country beyond the barriers that prevent the Civil Rights Act from 
fulfilling its promise.
146
 It will require constant discussion and education. 
In the context of the legal profession, it is critical to use as many tools as 
necessary to remove the dubious title of the “palest profession”. 
The promise will not be fulfilled if we are not intentional and if there is 
not recognition that all is not well. There must be a return to the basic 
principle of fairness. This is not an esoteric discussion. The majority of the 
United States Supreme Court has not concerned itself in recent years with 
the promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. There appears to be some 
notion that there is either nothing left to achieve as it relates to race, that or 
too much has already been given. It would further appear that using the 
precedent of the Act, the Supreme Court affords rights to other groups 
where race is not a factor. 
There must be a return to collective efforts similar to those employed 
during Freedom Summer or in South Africa to end Apartheid. It is 
necessary to recognize, as was done 50 years ago, that there is a problem. 
Not talking about it will not make it go away. Talking is a first step. The 
next step is a long-term process of cultural change. 
 
 
 146. See supra note 74. 
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